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PRIVATE REGULATION OF INSIDER
TRADING IN THE SHADOW OF
LAX PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT:
EVIDENCE FROM CANADIAN FIRMS
LAURA NYANTUNG BENY AND ANITA ANAND*
ABSTRACT
Like firms in the United States, many Canadian firms voluntarily restrict trading
by corporate insiders beyond the requirements of insider trading laws (i.e.,
super-compliance). Thus, we aim to understand the determinants of firms’ pri-
vate insider trading policies (ITPs), which are quasi-contractual devices. Based
on the assumption that firms that face greater costs from insider trading (or
greater benefits from restricting insider trading) ought to be more inclined than
other firms to adopt more stringent ITPs, we develop several testable hypothe-
ses. We test our hypotheses using data from a sample of firms included in the
Toronto Stock Exchange/Standard and Poor’s (TSX/S&P) Index. Our empirical
results suggest that Canadian firms do not randomly restrict insider trading, but
rather do so predictably and with a predictable level of intensity, suggesting that
some firms wish to control insider trading to enhance corporate performance.
Our most robust finding is that firms with a greater prevalence of controlling
shareholders are more likely to have adopted a super-compliant ITP than firms
with fewer such shareholders, implying that influential shareholders may oppose
insider trading and challenging the claim that private restrictions of insider
trading would not arise in the absence of insider trading laws.
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INTRODUCTION
Despite legal prohibitions on trading by corporate insiders who have
material, non-public information, many United States and Canadian firms
have implemented private insider trading policies (ITPs) that restrict trading
by their executives and other employees. In many cases, these ITPs are more
stringent than the host country’s insider trading laws. Although insider trad-
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ing laws are the subject of several recent comparative empirical studies,1
very few studies examine firms’ voluntary regulation of insider trading
through ITPs. Bettis et al. find that voluntary ITPs are widespread in the
United States and often more restrictive than U.S. insider trading law.2  Sim-
ilarly, as we demonstrate in this article, many publicly-traded Canadian
firms have private ITPs that are frequently more restrictive than Canadian
insider trading laws.
ITPs implicate an influential empirical claim in the law and economics
literature on insider trading, namely that shareholders seldom, if ever, nego-
tiated private contracts banning insider trading when it was legal.3 Some
scholars argue that the historical absence of such contracts proves that share-
holders do not object to insider trading and thus the prohibition of insider
trading is unnecessary and even efficiency-reducing.4 One may thus wonder
why insider trading laws exist at all, assuming that statutory laws reflect the
bargain that private parties would reach in the absence of such laws. One
1 See, e.g., Laura Nyantung Beny, The Political Economy of Insider Trading Laws and
Enforcement: Law v. Politics? International Evidence, in INSIDER TRADING RESEARCH HAND-
BOOK (forthcoming 2013); Laura Nyantung Beny, Do Investors in Controlled Firms Value
Insider Trading Laws? International Evidence, 4 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 267 (2008); Laura Nyan-
tung Beny, Insider Trading Laws and Stock Markets around the World: An Empirical Contri-
bution to the Theoretical Law and Economics Debate, 32 J. CORP. L. 237 (2007); Laura
Nyantung Beny, Do Insider Trading Laws Matter? Some Preliminary Comparative Evidence,
7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 144 (2005); Utpal Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, The World Price of
Insider Trading, 57 J. FIN. 75 (2002); Arturo Bris, Do Insider Trading Laws Work?, 11 EUR.
FIN. MGMT. 267 (2005); Robert M. Bushman et al., Insider Trading Restrictions and Analysts’
Incentives to Follow Firms, 60 J. FIN. 35 (2005); Art A. Durnev & Amrita S. Nain, Does
Insider Trading Regulation Deter Private Information Trading? International Evidence, 15
PAC.-BASIN FIN. J. 409 (2007); Nuno Fernandes & Miguel A. Ferreira, Insider Trading Laws
and Stock Price Informativeness, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 1845 (2009); Adriana Korczak & M.
Ameziane Lasfer, Does Cross-Listing Mitigate Insider Trading? (2008) (unpublished manu-
script), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1102130; Ernst G. Maug et al., In-
sider Trading Legislation and Acquisition Announcements: Do Laws Matter?, (2008)
(unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=868708;
2 J.C. Bettis et al., Corporate Policies Restricting Trading by Insiders, 57 J. FIN. ECON.
191, 192, 218 (2000).
3 Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 857, 858 (1983).
4 Some legal scholars argue that the fact that there were few private contracts prohibiting
insider trading in the United States prior to the legal prohibition suggests that firms and share-
holders had no desire to restrict insider trading. Id. at 894. From this, they conclude that insider
trading is not inefficient. These scholars implicitly dismiss the possibility that shareholders
lacked the capacity to negotiate such contracts because of information deficiencies, asymmet-
ric bargaining power, and insider self-dealing. James D. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting:
A Critical Response to the Chicago School, 1986 DUKE L.J. 628, 653–55 (1986); Frank Easter-
brook, Insider Trading as an Agency Problem, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF
BUSINESS (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser, eds., 1991). Thus, they ignore the possibil-
ity that the absence of a ban made stock markets and firms less efficient than they otherwise
might have been. In addition, contractual restrictions would probably be unenforceable even
today absent regulatory intervention. Computerized surveillance is the most efficient means to
detect insider trading. Public or quasi-public regulators have access to such technology, but
corporations generally are not in the business of trade surveillance, let alone self-reporting of
insider trading violations. Before 1934, difficulties in spotting insider trading surely were even
greater and efforts to disguise it easier than today.
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may also wonder why firms voluntarily adopt ITPs when insider trading is
already illegal, especially if hypothetical private bargaining would permit
such trading.
Focusing on the latter question, we can identify at least four reasons
why firms establish ITPs. The first and most obvious is that firms may adopt
ITPs to demonstrate legal compliance and thus avoid corporate liability,
since having an ITP in place may shield a corporation from insider trading
liability.5 This explanation resolves the apparent inconsistency between the
claim that firms did not desire to restrict insider trading when it was legal
and the fact that many firms privately restrict insider trading now that it is
illegal. Second, firms may adopt ITPs to reduce trading costs and thus in-
crease the liquidity of their shares, since evidence suggests that insider trad-
ing increases trading costs.6  Third, firms may adopt ITPs to reduce agency
costs, i.e., the costs that arise from the divergence of interests between man-
agers and shareholders and the consequent need for shareholders to monitor
managers.7 Several proponents of insider trading restrictions argue that in-
sider trading distorts managers’ and dominant shareholders incentives to the
detriment of corporate value and small outside shareholders.8
The first explanation, the compliance/liability avoidance rationale, does
not necessarily imply that firms perceive insider trading per se to be eco-
nomically harmful. In contrast, the second and third explanations suggest
that firms privately restrict insider trading to enhance economic efficiency
(corporate performance) and thus challenge the twin claims that shareholders
do not dislike insider trading and would not restrict it but for the law. These
explanations are not mutually exclusive, and a firm may adopt an ITP for
one or more of the foregoing reasons.
A fourth explanation is that ITPs are mere “window dressing”, assum-
ing they are costless for firms to enact and publicize. Under the window
dressing rationale, firms adopt intentionally toothless ITPs to curry favor
with outside investors, who may view insider trading as unfair or inefficient
and mistakenly believe that an ITP offers real additional protection. Bettis et
al. suggest, however, that ITPs are effective among U.S. firms that have
5 Alan D. Jagolinzer & Darren T. Roulstone, Litigation Risk and the Timing of Insiders’
Trades around Earnings Announcements (2007) (unpublished working paper); Bettis et al.,
supra note 2, at 192. R
6 Bhattacharya & Daouk, supra note 1, at 78; Beny, Do Insider Trading Laws Matter? R
Some Preliminary Comparative Evidence, supra note 1, at 144, 146; Thomas E. Copeland & R
Dan Galai, Information Effects on the Bid-Ask Spread, 38 J. FIN. 1457, 1457–58, 1460 (1983);
Lawrence R Glosten & Lawrence E Harris, Estimating the Components of the Bid/Ask Spread,
21 J. FIN. ECON. 123, 140–41 (1988).
7 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 323 (1976).
8 See, e.g., Reinier H. Kraakman, The Legal Theory of Insider Trading Regulation in the
United States, in EUROPEAN INSIDER DEALING: LAW AND PRACTICE (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy
Wymeersch eds., 1991); Ernst G. Maug, Insider Trading Legislation and Corporate Govern-
ance, 46 EUR. ECON. REV. 1569, 1570, 1588 (2002).
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adopted them.9 They find that even in the U.S., where insider trading laws
are vigorously enforced, ITPs suppress insider trading.10 They find that bid-
ask spreads are lower, i.e., liquidity is higher, during black-out periods, i.e.,
periods in which insiders are forbidden to trade pursuant to an ITP. Their
results suggest that U.S. firms adopt ITPs at least partly to enhance corporate
performance.11
Bettis et al. take ITPs as given, however, and do not investigate whether
some firms are more inclined to adopt ITPs or to adopt more stringent ITPs
than other firms. Roulstone, however, does investigate firm-level determi-
nants of private restrictions on insider trading among U.S. firms and finds
that larger firms and firms with greater analyst following (publicity), greater
institutional ownership, and past experience of insider trading litigation are
more likely to adopt private insider trading restrictions.12 Like Bettis et al.,
though, Roulstone does not exploit variation in ITP stringency across
firms.13
In this study, we take the next step and investigate firm-level determi-
nants of ITP stringency. This investigation will, we hope, help shed light on
firms’ motives for adopting ITPs and thus inform the insider trading debate.
We develop and test five hypotheses based on the assumption that firms that
face greater costs from insider trading (or greater benefits from restricting
insider trading) will be more inclined than other firms to adopt ITPs that are
more restrictive than existing insider trading law, which we refer to as super-
compliant ITPs. Therefore, we hypothesize that ITP stringency is positively
associated with: (1) firm size, (2) a firm’s market-to-book ratio, (3) concen-
trated share ownership/control, (4) firm-specific stock return volatility, and
(5) cross-listing on a U.S. stock exchange. We explain these hypotheses in
greater detail below.
We investigate our hypotheses using a sample of 181 firms that were
included in the Toronto Stock Exchange/Standard & Poor’s (TSX/S&P) In-
dex as of December 31, 2005. The TSX is Canada’s largest stock exchange,
accounting for over 80% of Canada’s equity trading volume between 1987
and 2000,14 so it is fairly representative of Canadian public corporations. For
each firm in our sample, we examine whether the firm has an ITP and the
substance of the firm’s ITP, if one exists, including whether it is more strin-
gent than Canadian insider trading law. We use firm-specific characteristics
to test our predictions about the relative strictness of a given firm’s ITP. We
9 Bettis et al., supra note 2, at 209. R
10 Indeed, they suggest that ITPs and public enforcement may be more effective at sup-
pressing insider trading than public enforcement alone. Id. at 193.
11 Id.
12 Darren T. Roulstone, The Relation between Insider-Trading Restrictions and Executive
Compensation, 41 J. ACCT. RES. 525, 536, 544 (2003).
13 See id.; see also Bettis et al., supra note 2. R
14 William J. McNally & Brian F. Smith, Do Insiders Play by the Rules?, 29 CAN. PUB.
POL’Y–ANALYSE DE POLITIQUE 125, 128 (2003).
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are able to test our hypotheses because of interfirm variation in ITP strin-
gency relative to Canadian insider trading law.
The Canadian stock market provides a good setting for testing our hy-
potheses. As we elaborate in greater detail below, insider trading enforce-
ment is relatively lax in Canada.15 If firms view insider trading as
economically harmful, this ought to give Canadian firms an incentive to
adopt ITPs, and quite possibly ITPs that are more stringent than Canadian
insider trading law, i.e., super-compliant ITPs. Conversely, if firms view
insider trading as economically beneficial, lax enforcement ought to create
an incentive for Canadian firms to forego ITPs or limit them merely to what
the law already requires.
In addition, Canadian firms tend to have more concentrated share own-
ership, and thus are more likely to have controlling shareholders, than U.S.
firms.16 Controlling shareholders may be able to engage in insider trading
more readily than other shareholders because of their ready access to private
information.17 Lax enforcement and a greater prevalence of controlling
shareholders suggest that insider trading may be relatively more prevalent in
Canada than in the U.S. or some other countries.
Voluntary ITPs are common among firms on the TSX/S&P Index.
Ninety-two percent of the firms in our sample have an ITP and 41% of these
have an ITP that is more stringent than Canadian law. Our empirical analysis
supports several of our hypotheses. Our results suggest that neither window
dressing, legal compliance/liability avoidance, nor U.S. regulatory imperial-
ism fully explains Canadian firms’ adoption of ITPs. TSX/S&P firms display
a range of private approaches to insider trading that roughly correlate, we
argue, with the private costs and benefits of restricting insider trading. Thus,
our findings suggest that at least some firms wish to control insider trading
to enhance corporate performance. Importantly, our results also suggest that
influential shareholders oppose insider trading.  Our single most robust re-
sult is that firms with a greater prevalence of controlling shareholders are
more likely to have adopted a super-compliant ITP.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the
motivation for this study and briefly reviews relevant literature. Part II de-
scribes Canadian law and recommended best practices on insider trading,
highlighting the more important differences between the Canadian and U.S.
insider trading regimes. Part III presents our hypotheses regarding the kinds
of firms that are likely to adopt an ITP that is stricter than Canadian insider
15 Id. Although enforcement appears to have improved in the past five years or so, it was
certainly less stringent during the time period of this study. See generally CANADIAN SEC.
ADMIN., 2012 ENFORCEMENT REPORT (2013).
16 R.J. Daniels, & E.M. Iacobucci, Some of the Causes and Consequences of Corporate
Ownership in Canada, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP (R. Morck, ed., 2000);
CORPORATE DECISION-MAKING IN CANADA (R.J. Daniels & R. Morck, eds., 1995).
17 Maug, supra note 8, at 1570; cf. Amar Bhide, The Hidden Costs of Stock Market Li- R
quidity, 34 J. FIN. ECON. 31, 33, 37 (1993); Harold Demsetz, Corporate Control, Insider Trad-
ing, and Rates of Return, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 313, 313–14 (1986).
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trading law. Part IV describes our data and empirical methodology and
presents the results. We then conclude.
I. MOTIVATION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Even though insider trading is generally illegal,18 the debate among le-
gal and financial scholars about whether insider trading ought to be regu-
lated has persisted since the 1960s. What is at stake in the debate is the
appropriate allocation of rights to benefit from corporate information.19 The
question that legal scholars pose is whether such rights ought to be available
equally to outside investors and corporate insiders (and their tippees), or
whether the latter ought to be able to benefit, at least for a period of time,
from their privileged access to such information. The fact that insider trading
is illegal, at least on the books, in virtually every country with a stock mar-
ket suggests that lawmakers around the world, unlike some scholars, believe
the better policy is to make rights to trade on corporate information more
equally available.20
The debate initially centered on whether insider trading is unfair to pub-
lic investors not privy to private corporate information.21 In the late 1960s,
the terms of the debate shifted from the fairness of insider trading to its
economic efficiency when Professor Manne published his influential book,
Insider Trading and the Stock Market, in which he argued that insider trad-
ing is efficient and hence desirable.22 He justified his conclusion by arguing
that the ability to engage in insider trading motivates insiders to be more
entrepreneurial and leads to more accurate stock prices, i.e., stock prices that
reflect all current information about a stock’s “true” value and not merely
public information.23
18 See Bhattacharya & Daouk, supra note 1, at 88–89. R
19 JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND POLICY (1991).
Macey likens this right to a property right in corporate information. Id. However, it is not
exactly a property right because insiders cannot summon the law to protect corporate informa-
tion from others, even when trading on inside information is legal. Likewise, outsiders cannot
use the law to monopolize such information. Arrow’s characterization of business information
as a public good is a more apt description, though like many other public goods some parties
are in a far better position to exploit it. Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation
of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, ed. 1962). See Beny, The Political
Economy of Insider Trading Laws and Enforcement: Law v. Politics? International Evidence,
supra note 1, for a political economy analysis of insider trading legislation and enforcement. R
20 Lawmakers have rejected full equality of access, however, because of the infeasibility
and likely inefficiency of full equality. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233
(1980).
21 Roy A. Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the
Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1433–35 (1967); see also Victor Brudney, Insiders, Out-
siders, and Informational Advantages under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV.
322, 334 (1979).
22 HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966).
23 Id.
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In the course of the insider trading debate, a third, intermediate position
emerged. This intermediate position maintains that insider trading is efficient
for some firms and inefficient for others.24 Proponents of the intermediate
position believe that corporate efficiency would be maximized if regulators
allowed firms, shareholders and corporate insiders to contract privately over
whether to allow or to prohibit insider trading within a firm. The market,
they maintain, will ensure that the appropriate bargain will be struck for each
firm, prohibiting insider trading by contract in cases where it is inefficient
and allowing insider trading where it is efficient.25 This theoretical debate
resists resolution because, as noted above, insider trading is illegal in virtu-
ally every stock market.
Thus, in a departure from the pure Coasian theme, ITPs are adopted in
the shadow of insider trading laws. This means that ITPs will tend to be
skewed toward greater strictness than existing law because if they are less
strict, they add nothing to the law’s rigor and may even create legal liability
for under-compliant firms. Indeed, U.S. and Canadian ITPs are left-cen-
sored, i.e., they are either equally or more restrictive, and are never more
permissive, than what the respective insider trading laws require. Still, ITPs
are somewhat like contractual choices to prohibit insider trading, except that
companies may adopt them unilaterally, i.e., without outside consent, and
they may not always spring from direct negotiations between insiders and
public shareholders. We aim to understand the firm-level determinants of
these quasi-contractual choices in relation to Canadian insider trading law
and thereby inform the perennial theoretical debate.
This article contributes to the recent wave of comparative empirical re-
search on insider trading regulation, with a focus on the Canadian stock
market, which is heavily influenced by economic and regulatory develop-
ments in the U.S. This recent scholarship attempts to understand the effi-
ciency consequences of insider trading laws by exploiting statistical
variation in such laws across countries.26 Thus far, the evidence seems to
support the regulatory stance rather than the deregulatory position. Beny, for
example, finds that more stringent insider trading laws are associated with
more dispersed equity ownership, more accurate stock prices, and greater
stock market liquidity.27 Bhattacharya and Daouk, using data from all coun-
24 Richard Epstein, In Defense of the Corporation, 2004 N.Z. L. REV. 707, 713–14 (2004);
David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, Coasian Model of Insider Trading, 80 NW. U. L.
REV. 1449, 1467–68 (1987).
25 See Haddock & Macey, supra note 24, at 1467–68; Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at R
863.
26 Although it is not possible to compare markets without regulation to markets with regu-
lation, since insider trading is illegal in almost every stock market, it is possible to compare
markets with varying degrees of regulation and enforcement. This is what the recent literature
does.
27 Beny, Insider Trading Laws and Stock Markets around the World: An Empirical Contri-
bution to the Theoretical Law and Economics Debate, supra note 1, at 240; Beny, Do Insider R
Trading Laws Matter? Some Preliminary Comparative Evidence, supra note 1, at 146. R
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tries with stock markets, find that stock market liquidity systematically in-
creased after insider trading regulation was enacted and that the cost of
equity fell significantly after the first incidence of enforcement.28 Bushman
et al. find that investment analyst attention, which is widely thought to be
beneficial to stock market efficiency, increases after a country enforces its
insider trading laws.29 Beny also finds that insider trading laws are associ-
ated with greater corporate valuation among firms with a controlling share-
holder in common law countries.30
Our research also contributes to the recent empirical literature on vol-
untary corporate governance. The bulk of this literature investigates whether
corporate performance is affected by voluntary governance practices.31 There
is relatively less focus on which factors predict a firm’s adoption of govern-
ance standards. Durnev and Kim, however, examine this issue.32 They find
that investment opportunities, external financing, and ownership structure
significantly influence voluntary governance practices and that the strength
of their influence depends in part on a country’s legal environment.33 In addi-
tion, Anand et al. find that many Canadian firms voluntarily adopt govern-
ance practices beyond those required by Canadian corporate law and the
number of Canadian firms voluntarily adopting such practices is growing.34
They also find that it is not only the home country’s governance regime that
influences the stringency of the governance practices adopted but also the
corporate governance standards of the United States, where many Canadian
firms seek external finance.35 Since ITPs are a kind of voluntary corporate
governance standard, this article contributes to this literature as well. By
exploring the characteristics that lead Canadian firms to adopt super-compli-
ant ITPs, we illuminate the determinants of an important subset of corporate
governance rules.
28 Bhattacharya & Daouk, supra note 1, at 91–93, 104. R
29 Bushman et al., supra note 1, at 60. R
30 Beny, Do Investors in Controlled Firms Value Insider Trading Laws? International Evi-
dence, supra note 1, at 267, 291. R
31 See Jerilyn W. Coles et al., An Examination of the Relationship of Governance Mecha-
nisms to Performance, 27 J. MGMT. 23 (2001); Craig Doidge et al., Why Are Foreign Firms
Listed in the U.S. Worth More?, 71 J. FIN. ECON. 205 (2004); Bernard S. Black et al., Does
Corporate Governance Predict Firms’ Market Values? Evidence from Korea, 22 J.L., ECON. &
ORG. 366 (2006).
32 Art Durnev & E. Han Kim, To Steal or Not to Steal: Firm Attributes, Legal Environ-
ment, and Valuation, 60 J. FIN. 1461 (2005).
33 Id. at 1476–78.
34 Anita I. Anand et al., Domestic and International Influences on Firm-Level Govern-
ance: Evidence from Canada, 14 AM. L & ECON. REV. 68, 82, 103 (2012).
35 Id. at 106.
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II. A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE CANADIAN AND U.S. INSIDER
TRADING REGIMES
Canada does not have a national securities regulator.36 Securities laws,
including insider trading laws, are enacted and enforced at the provincial and
territorial levels, unlike in the U.S. where securities laws are federally en-
acted and enforced. In this section, we focus on the insider trading law of the
province of Ontario, which is home to Canada’s deepest capital markets and
the Toronto Stock Exchange, and thus governs all of the firms in our sample.
However, insider trading law is generally consistent across Canadian
jurisdictions.
In Ontario, the basic rules on insider trading are set forth in a statute
that regulates both legal and illegal insider trading.37 In terms of illegal in-
sider trading, “insiders” (a defined class) may purchase or sell securities,
provided that their trades are not based on undisclosed (non-public) material
information and are reported within ten days from the date of the trade. The
relevant legal provision states, “No person or company in a special relation-
ship with a reporting issuer shall purchase or sell securities of the reporting
issuer with the knowledge of a material fact or material change with respect
to the reporting issuer that has not been generally disclosed.” 38 The precise
legal elements of illegal insider trading in Ontario are thus: a) a special rela-
tionship between the insider and the issuing corporation; b) material fact or
material change; and c) not generally disclosed. Tipping, defined as inform-
ing any other person of a material fact or material change that is not gener-
ally disclosed other than in the necessary course of business is also
prohibited under the statute.39 While Canadian firms are not legally required
to adopt an ITP, it is a recommended best practice for them to do so. Na-
tional Policy 51-201, “Disclosure Standards,” contains best practices relat-
ing to disclosure, and recommends that firms:
(1) appoint a senior officer to approve and monitor trading by all insiders,
(2) prohibit insiders and employees from trading while in possession of ma-
terial non-public information, (3) specify blackout periods (explicit periods
during which all trading is prohibited) that apply to insiders, officers and
employees,40 and (4) establish procedures by which insiders, officers and
36 Reference Re Securities Act, 2011 SCC 66, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 837. See also WISE PER-
SON’S COMM. TO REV. THE STRUCTURE OF SEC. REGULATION IN CAN., IT’S TIME 15 (2003),
available at http://www.wise-averties.ca/reports/WPC%20Final.pdf.
37 Securities Act (Ontario), R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, s. 76, 107 (Can.).
38 R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, s. 76(1) (emphasis added).
39 R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, s. 76(2).
40 A blackout period, for example, may extend from one month before the firm’s earnings
release—the period in which the firm is preparing its financial statements, management discus-
sion and analysis (MD&A) and other material, non-public information—to two days after the
firm publicly issues its earnings release—to give the market time to disseminate and incorpo-
rate the new information into the firm’s share price. See, e.g., Jagolinzer & Roulstone, supra
note 5; Roulstone, supra note 12, at 544; Bettis et al., supra note 2, at 197–98, 218. ITPs may R
also contain a brownout period, a period during which some but not all insiders are restricted
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employees must apply for approval to trade during blackout periods.41 While
not a recommended best practice per se, firms may also adopt internal (i.e.,
private) enforcement or disciplinary mechanisms in their ITPs consisting of
such measures as unpaid leave, suspension or even dismissal for those who
violate the rules.
In addition to the foregoing recommended best practices, National Pol-
icy 58-201 sets forth various corporate governance guidelines (as opposed to
mandatory rules), including a recommendation that boards adopt a “code of
business conduct and ethics.”42 Some Canadian firms choose to implement
an ITP as part of this code.43 Although Canadian firms are not required to
adopt such a code, once a firm adopts one, it must file the code and disclo-
sure regarding the code’s contents is mandatory. However, the firm is not
required to include the details of its ITP in such disclosure. Most impor-
tantly, the choice of whether to adopt an ITP is ultimately voluntary in Ca-
nada. None of the post-Sarbanes Oxley corporate governance legislation
implemented in Canada requires firms to adopt an ITP.44 In addition, relative
to other optional corporate governance standards, Canadian securities regu-
lators have not pressed firms to adopt these policies.45
U.S. insider trading laws differ from Canadian insider trading laws in
several respects. First, as noted above, Canadian provincial securities stat-
utes explicitly forbid insiders from purchasing or selling securities based on
material information that has not been publicly disclosed. By contrast, in the
U.S., Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is a general anti-
fraud provision that prohibits the use of “any device, scheme, or artifice” or
any “act, practice or course of business” to defraud or deceive “in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of any security.”46 On its face, Rule 10b-5
from trading. For example, an ITP may bar the persons who are part of a “deal team” working
on a significant transaction involving the firm from trading until the deal is publicly disclosed.
41 NATIONAL POLICY 51-201 – DISCLOSURE STANDARDS, s. 6.10, available at http://www.
osc.gov.on.ca/en/20970.htm.
42 NATIONAL POLICY 58-201 – CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES, available at http://
www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/14206.htm. National Policy statements provide guidance on “best prac-
tices” and thus are not meant to be binding on firms. The extent of insider trading regulation
that operates through National Policy statements demonstrates the voluntary nature of the Ca-
nadian regulatory regime; this suggests that our results may understate the prevalence of vol-
untary ITPs among Canadian firms to the extent that some firms have such policies but choose
not to report them.
43 NATIONAL INSTRUMENT 58-101 – DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES,
available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/14198.htm.
44 In 2004, subsequent to the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms in the U.S., Canadian securities
regulators adopted mandatory corporate governance rules requiring certification of financial
statements and audit committee composition. See MULTILATERAL INSTRUMENT 52-109 – CER-
TIFICATION OF DISCLOSURE IN ISSUERS’ ANNUAL AND INTERIM FILINGS, available at http://
www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/13542.htm; see also MULTILATERAL INSTRUMENT 52-110 – AUDIT
COMMITTEES, available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/13550.htm.
45 In a few cases, however, the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) required the firm to
adopt an ITP in a legal settlement of insider trading claims against the firm. See, e.g., DX-
Storm.Com Inc. (Re). 2007 LNONOSC 364 at para. 10.
46 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1951).
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does not prohibit insider trading. Since the 1960s, however, U.S. courts have
consistently interpreted the rule as prohibiting corporate insiders from trad-
ing on the basis of material, nonpublic information unless they publicly dis-
close such information prior to trading.47 Effectively, then, the basic
Canadian and U.S. insider trading prohibitions are the same, even though the
U.S. prohibition does not explicitly address insider trading as such. In both
countries, insiders may trade their firms’ securities if such trading is not
based on material undisclosed information. In addition, in both countries,
insiders must disclose changes in the ownership of their positions, including
all purchases and dispositions of the firm’s securities.
Second, short-swing profits are permissible in Canada but prohibited in
the U.S. In the U.S., Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
requires an insider who buys (sells) the securities of the issuer and sells
(buys) them within six months to give the resulting profits to the company.48
Section 16(b), unlike Rule 10b-5, covers only directors, officers, or stock-
holders owning more than 10% of the firm’s shares. In addition, as a prophy-
lactic rule, Section 16(b) applies regardless of whether an insider trades on
immaterial or public information, arguably over-deterring insider trading.49
In contrast, Canada does not prohibit short-swing profits. Moreover, foreign
firms (including Canadian firms) that are cross-listed in the U.S. are exempt
from Section 16(b).50
Third, U.S. and Canadian insider trading laws differ in how they define
an “insider.” In Canada, the insider trading prohibition applies to individu-
als who are in a “special relationship” with the reporting issuer.51 The statu-
tory definition of special relationship in Canadian law is broad and includes
a number of persons who would not fall under the U.S.’s formal definition of
47 This is the so-called “disclose or abstain” rule. A seminal early case was SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). U.S. federal
case law treats insider trading as a violation of common law fiduciary duties. See, e.g.,
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 223, 228 (1980); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 647,
654–55 (1983).
48 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b (2011). It is straightforward to see how an insider might profit
from buying and then selling her company’s shares within a six-month period. A profit will
result if she buys the shares at a lower price than the price at which she subsequently sells
them. It is less obvious how she might profit from selling and then buying her company’s
shares within a six month period. A “profit” will result, however, in the form of “loss avoid-
ance,” if she sells the shares at a higher price than the price at which she subsequently buys
them back. For example, if the insider sells the shares on January 1 for $20 and then buys them
back on March 1 for $5, she will have avoided a loss of $15. Another way in which she might
profit from a sell-buy transaction is by selling the shares short (i.e., borrowing the shares and
then selling them) at the current market price which is higher than the price at which she
subsequently will buy them back in order to return the shares to the lender and close the
contract. Insiders are prohibited from short-selling in the U.S. under Section 16(b), but Canada
does not have a comparable rule. Id.
49 Id. For a critique of Section 16b from a Canadian perspective, see Bernard J. Davies,
Canadian and American Attitudes on Insider Trading, 25 U. TORONTO L.J. 215 (1975).
50 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b (2011).
51 R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, s. 76(5) (Can.).
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“insider.”52 In the U.S., Section 16(a)(1) of the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934 indirectly defines insiders as officers, directors and 10% sharehold-
ers.53 Although this definition is not as broad as its Canadian statutory coun-
terpart, U.S. case law articulates a broad range of additional individuals who
are subject to the basic insider trading prohibition and who would fall within
the Canadian definition of “special relationship.” For example, tippees are
prohibited from trading in the U.S., even though they are neither insiders nor
in any special relationship with the firm.54 In addition, U.S. case law extends
the insider trading prohibition to so-called “constructive” or “secondary”
insiders, a class that includes the firm’s lawyers, investment bankers, ac-
countants, and others in possession of confidential corporate information.55
Finally, the misappropriation theory, an American judicial doctrine, extends
the insider trading prohibition to persons who do not have a fiduciary duty to
the firm or its shareholders, but who have a fiduciary duty to the source of
the information.56 Thus, there is little effective difference between Canada
and the U.S. concerning the scope of the basic insider trading prohibition.
Finally, unlike in Canada, it is not a recommended best practice for
U.S. firms to adopt ITPs. Nevertheless, U.S. law provides a strong incentive
for firms to adopt private codes governing insider trading because under
Section 20A of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (“The Insider Trad-
ing and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988”) a firm may be held
derivatively liable for its employees’ illegal insider trading unless the firm
can prove that it acted in good faith and did not induce such trading.57 One
way a firm can provide evidence of good faith and non-inducement is to
show that it had an ITP in place prior to the alleged illegal trading and that
the employees traded in spite of the internal prohibition (e.g., a blackout
period).58
The most important differences between the U.S. and Canadian insider
trading regimes concern enforcement. The U.S. has both a longer history and
greater intensity of insider trading enforcement than Canada. The Ontario
Securities Commission (OSC) conducted its first insider trading prosecution
in 1973, while the first U.S. insider trading case occurred more than a dec-
52 Insiders include not only people in a special relationship with the firm but also parties
making a takeover bid or engaged in some other proposed transaction with the issuer. Direc-
tors, officers and employees are considered insiders, as are individuals who learned of a mate-
rial fact or change from any of these individuals. Insiders include any person who learns of a
material fact or change from anyone described in the statutory definition and who ought to
have known that the person from whom she received such information was in a special rela-
tionship with the issuer. Id.
53 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a (2011). Moreover, Rule 16a-1(f) defines “officer.” Id.
54 See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 647, 659, 660 (1983).
55 See, e.g., Dirks, 463 U.S. at 677, n.14; SEC v. Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397, 1493 (C.D.
Cal. 1983).
56 See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 659 (1997).
57 The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-1,
80b-4a, 78t-1 (2006) (as amended).
58 Id.
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ade earlier. In sharp contrast with the United Sates, there have been few
insider trading convictions and no successful tipping convictions in Ca-
nada.59 According to McNally and Smith, “[o]n average, there has been less
than one insider trading conviction a year since 1980 [and] only two cases
where insiders were charged with failure to report their trading activity.”60
By comparison, over the same period the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) settled or prosecuted over 550 insider trading cases.61
Two reasons for the difficulty of obtaining insider trading convictions in
Canada (especially in quasi-criminal cases brought by the regulator in pro-
vincial court) are the relatively high burden of proving scienter62 and appar-
ent ambiguities in interpreting the applicable materiality standard.63 Another
reason is Canada’s relatively thin budget for insider trading enforcement.64
The U.S. and Canadian comparative insider trading enforcement pat-
terns are consistent with their general comparative securities enforcement
profiles.65 Jackson compares U.S. and Canadian enforcement budgets and
staffing levels and “enforcement intensity,” which he defines as “the fre-
quency and severity with which a country’s legal regime imposes sanctions
on capital market participants.” He finds that “Canadian enforcement activ-
ity is less intensive [in many areas] than U.S. enforcement activity.”66 Be-
tween 2002 and 2004, the differences between the two countries were “so
huge that they swamp[ed] any possible scaling adjustment [for market
size].”67 While public enforcement activity in Canada has increased in re-
cent years, Jackson reports that it is still lower than U.S. activity even taking
into account scaling issues.68 Jackson’s findings suggest that Canadian firms
cross-listed in the U.S. face a greater threat of enforcement than non-cross-
listed Canadian firms.
59 R. v. Rankin, [2006] O.J. No. 4579 (Can.) (overturning the first successful conviction
of tipping under the Ontario Securities Act [2005] O.J. No. 3202 (Can.)). See also McNally &
Smith, supra note 14, at 129. R
60 McNally & Smith, supra note 14, at 136. R
61 Id. at 135. For more recent U.S. enforcement data, see Laura Nyantung Beny & H.
Nejat Seyhun, Has Insider Trading Become More Rampant in the United States? Evidence
from Takeovers, in Insider Trading Research Handbook (Stephen Bainbridge, ed., 2013).
62 Davies, supra note 49, at 231–32; CANADIAN INSIDER TRADING TASK FORCE, ILLEGAL R
INSIDER TRADING IN CANADA: RECOMMENDATIONS ON PREVENTION, DETECTION AND DETER-
RENCE 39 (2003), available at http://www.investorvoice.ca/Research/CSA_InsiderTrading
TaskForce_12Nov03.pdf.
63 The key recent Canadian case highlighting these substantive issues is R. v Felderhof
[2007] ONCJ345 (Can.).
64 WISE PERSON’S COMM. TO REV. THE STRUCTURE OF SEC. REGULATION IN CAN., supra
note 36, at 27. R
65 Cf. id. at 25, 27; HOWELL E. JACKSON, REGULATORY INTENSITY IN THE REGULATION OF
CAPITAL MARKETS: A PRELIMINARY COMPARISON OF CANADIAN AND U.S. APPROACHES 98
(2006), available at http://thievesofbaystreet.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Howell-Jackson-
Study-on-Resources.pdf.
66 JACKSON, supra note 65, at 81, 82, 99. R
67 Id. at 83.
68 Id.
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Because of lax public enforcement and the rarity of private enforce-
ment,69 insider trading has been viewed as being relatively prevalent in Ca-
nada.70  Indeed, McNally and Smith present “large-scale” evidence of
insider trading and reporting violations in Canada.71 Similarly, Bris finds that
insider trading profits prior to the public announcement of mergers are the
highest in Canada among the 52 countries in his study.72 Thus, if Canadian
firms perceive insider trading as economically harmful, they may be inclined
to enact private restrictions via ITPs, particularly super-compliant ITPs, to
fill the enforcement gap. We empirically investigate this possibility in Part
IV, after presenting our hypotheses and methodology in Part III.
III. HYPOTHESES AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
Some scholars argue that shareholders do not disapprove of insider
trading, claiming that U.S. firms did not voluntarily prohibit insider trading
prior to its legal prohibition.73 While most firms may not have voluntarily
prohibited insider trading prior to legal intervention, this history-based argu-
ment assumes perfectly efficient markets. However, markets are not per-
fectly efficient, thus rendering extralegal Coasian bargains over insider
trading policy between firms and dispersed public shareholders problematic,
if not impossible.74 Moreover, historical claims aside, the reality is that many
U.S. and Canadian firms do show a desire to control insider trading by
adopting super-compliant ITPs that supplement mandatory insider trading
laws. In the empirical portion of this article, we examine the characteristics
of firms that adopt super-compliant ITPs. Our analysis does not directly ex-
amine the efficiency of insider trading regulation but does bear on it and
suggests, as we explain below, that at least some shareholders may not per-
ceive unregulated insider trading to be innocuous, let alone efficient.
69 Theoretically, shareholders may privately enforce Canadian insider trading legislation
by bringing class action lawsuits. Shareholder class actions are rare in Canada, however,
mainly because of the rejection of the “fraud on the market” doctrine in Ontario. Carom v.
Bre-X Minerals Ltd., [2000] 51 O.R.3d 236 (Can.). Canadian shareholders in theory may also
launch an oppression remedy stemming from breach of an ITP by insiders. Corporate statutes
in Canadian provinces allow complainants to apply to a court for an order that would remedy
any action of a corporation, its affiliates or its directors that is “oppressive or unfairly prejudi-
cial to or that unfairly disregards the interests of any security holder, creditor, director or
officer.” To our knowledge, however, such a case (i.e., for breach of an ITP) has never been
brought.
70 Editorial, When Insiders Go Bad, GLOBE AND MAIL, Oct. 23, 2001, at A16; cf. CANA-
DIAN INSIDER TRADING TASK FORCE, supra note 62, at 4. R
71 See McNally & Smith, supra note 14, at 129. R
72 Bris, supra note 1, at 287, 301. R
73 Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 894; but see Robert A. Prentice & Dain Donelson, R
Insider Trading as a Signaling Device, 47 AM. BUS. L. J. 1 (2010) (presenting counter-
evidence to the claim that insider trading restrictions were not desired prior to the insider
trading prohibition).
74 See Cox, supra note 4. R
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For the purpose of predicting which firm characteristics are associated
with the adoption of a super-compliant ITP, we assume that, other things
equal, a firm is more likely to have an ITP that is stricter than what Canadian
law requires: (1) the greater the opportunity/incentive for insider trading, (2)
the greater the potential costs of insider trading, and/or (3) the greater the
potential benefits from preventing insider trading. These assumptions moti-
vate our specific hypotheses, which, in summary form, are that ITP exis-
tence and ITP stringency are positively associated with: (1) firm size, (2) a
firm’s market-to-book ratio, (3) concentrated share ownership/control, (4)
firm-specific stock return volatility, and (5) cross-listing on a U.S. stock ex-
change. Before turning to our data and analysis, we explain these hypothe-
sized relationships in greater detail.
A. Hypothesis 1: Larger firms are more likely to adopt a super-
compliant ITP than smaller firms
There are several reasons, not mutually exclusive, why larger firms may
be more likely to have a super-compliant ITP than smaller firms. First, as
Bettis et al. suggest, larger firms are likely to have greater numbers of insid-
ers than smaller firms, making insider trading a more salient issue for the
former than for the latter firms.75 Second, “[l]arger firms are more likely
[than smaller firms] to have the organizational [or bureaucratic] ability to
monitor and restrict insiders.”76 Thus, building ITP monitoring and enforce-
ment into organizational procedures will be easier for larger firms than for
smaller firms. Third, larger firms tend to have more powerful outside share-
holders (e.g., pension funds and other institutional investors) than smaller
firms,77 so insider trading may occur at the expense of more powerful
outside interests in the former firms. Finally, larger firms face a higher level
of public scrutiny from analysts and the broader investing public than
smaller firms.78 Consequently, they may be more susceptible to negative
publicity stemming from the perceived unfairness or potential criminality of
insider trading. This can harm a firm’s image and its business generally.
Demonstrating compliance with insider trading laws by adopting a
super-compliant ITP may make a firm more attractive to investors who
know that corporate scandals can lead to sharp falls in share prices, or who
fear being on the losing end of inside trades. Relatedly, larger firms may see
themselves as business leaders and thus may want to adopt ITPs, since they
are considered best practices, especially if they are pressured to do so by
institutional investors who tend to be more prevalent among larger firms.79
75 Bettis et al., supra note 2, at 203. R
76 Roulstone, supra note 12, at 544. R
77 O’Brien & Bhushan, Analyst Following and Institutional Ownership, 28 J. ACCT. RES.
55, 58 (1990).
78 Id. at 72.
79 Id. at 58.
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B. Hypothesis 2: Firms with higher market-to-book ratios are more
likely to adopt a super-compliant ITP than firms with lower
market-to- book ratio.s
We predict that firms with higher market-to-book ratios—stock price
relative to book value per share80—are more likely to adopt super-complaint
ITPs. This is because they tend to have greater asymmetric information and
growth opportunities, both of which increase insider trading opportunities.
These firms tend to have a greater proportion of intangible assets, like intel-
lectual property, which makes it harder for outsiders to evaluate them and
gives insiders a distinct informational advantage vis-a`-vis outsiders, thus in-
creasing the potential profitability of insider trading. By contrast, a mature
business with a lower growth profile and relatively predictable earnings
should present fewer opportunities for insider trading, other things equal.
Consistent with Hypothesis 2, Bettis et al. find that insider trading activity is
positively related to a firm’s market-to-book ratio.81 Thus, if firms view in-
sider trading as harmful to their interests, they ought to be more inclined to
adopt a super-compliant ITP the higher their market-to-book ratio due to
greater insider trading opportunities among such firms.
C. Hypothesis 3: Firms with more influential outside investors are more
likely to adopt a super-compliant ITP than firms with fewer
such investors.
In Canada, large shareholders may be directly or indirectly subject to
the insider trading prohibition. First, Ontario law defines a shareholder as an
insider if the shareholder owns 10% or more of the firm’s voting securities.82
Thus, 10% shareholders are directly subject to the insider trading prohibi-
tion. Second, large shareholders who are officers or directors of the firm are
also directly subject to the prohibition by virtue of their officer or director
status, even if they own less than 10% of a firm’s shares.83  Finally, large
shareholders who are not directly subject to the prohibition are indirectly
subject to it by virtue of the fact that insiders are not allowed to tip outsiders,
including large shareholders who may otherwise solicit or receive tips from
insiders. One could argue that these factors ought to diminish rather than
increase corporate efforts to control insider trading via super-compliant
80 A high market-to-book ratio means that the company’s market valuation is greater than
the value of its assets. Firms with high market-to-book ratios tend to have a greater degree of
intellectual property, which is inherently more speculative and thus more difficult to value than
physical assets.
81 Bettis et al., supra note 2, at 203. R
82 R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, s. 1.1 (Can.).
83 In Canada, many large shareholders are also officers or directors. CORPORATE DECI-
SION-MAKING IN CANADA, supra note 15. R
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ITPs. Indeed, there are competing theoretical perspectives on the attitude of
large influential shareholders toward insider trading restrictions.
Demsetz and Bhide argue that concentrated ownership is desirable be-
cause large shareholders engage in valuable corporate monitoring, reducing
agency costs. However, they must be compensated for their monitoring ac-
tivities and for the risks of holding undiversified portfolios. Insider trading
profits are an efficient way to compensate these shareholders, they argue.84
Such profits, in the view of these theorists, are not unfair or inefficient wind-
falls but rather appropriate compensation. Restricting such compensation by
prohibiting insider trading will reduce large shareholders’ incentives to mon-
itor,85 by raising the costs and liabilities of active shareholding and monitor-
ing.86 This implies that firms that value large shareholder monitoring may
tend to shun super-compliant ITPs or at least exempt outside controlling
shareholders from the policy’s super-compliant provisions.
In contrast, Maug cautions that large shareholders may serve their own
interests at the expense of minority shareholders if they are permitted to
engage in insider trading.87 He argues that allowing insider trading may lead
large shareholders to seek profits not by monitoring managers in ways that
advance the interests of most investors but by using private knowledge to
expropriate wealth from outside investors. Maug argues that allowing insider
trading may enable managers to “bribe” dominant shareholders to forego
monitoring the firm when it is performing poorly by sharing private informa-
tion with them. If the firm’s stock is sufficiently liquid, trading on such in-
formation will provide greater profits than can be gained through close
monitoring and efforts to improve firm performance.88
Thus, firms with concentrated ownership may desire insider trading re-
strictions to reduce agency costs and encourage minority shareholders to in-
vest in the firm. Contrary to the prediction that would seem to follow from
Demsetz’ and Bhide’s analyses, this logic implies that firms with concen-
trated ownership may be more likely to adopt a super-compliant ITP than
firms with diffuse ownership, thus pre-committing to restrict trading by
84 Demsetz, supra note 17, at 314, 315; Bhide, supra note 17, at 43–44. R
85 Demsetz, supra note 17, at 313, 314; Bhide, supra note 17, at 46–47. R
86 Bhide, supra note 17, at 33, 46–47. Both Demsetz and Bhide oppose insider trading R
restrictions for precisely this reason.
87 Maug, supra note 8, at 1570, 1588. Along similar lines, La Porta et al. suggest that the R
primary agency problem in firms with controlling shareholders is the expropriation of minority
shareholders. Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471,
511 (1999). The implication is that the law ought to be concerned not only with preventing
managerial value diversion but also with containing expropriation by large shareholders. See,
e.g., id. at 512; Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1145, 1151
(1998); Mike Burkart & Fausto Panunzi, Agency Conflicts, Ownership Concentration, and
Legal Shareholder Protection, 15 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 1, 23 (2006).
88 Maug, supra note 8, at 1579–80, 1582–83. He demonstrates that, conditional on the R
stock’s liquidity, when insider trading is legal, dominant shareholders are more likely to col-
lude with managers at the expense of minority shareholders in exchange for trading profits,
whereas when insider trading is illegal, dominant shareholders are more likely to monitor
managers than to trade. Id. at 1582–83.
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dominant shareholders at the expense of minority shareholders. In addition,
non-insider controlling shareholders (e.g., institutional investors such as mu-
tual funds, pension funds, and the like) may wish to prevent insider trading
to reduce managerial agency costs.
The argument that large shareholders would prefer a super-compliant
ITP over a merely compliant ITP or none seems more compelling to us for
several reasons. First, Bhide opposes insider trading laws as a disincentive to
large shareholder monitoring. However, it is not clear that large shareholders
are insufficiently diversified such that they must be compensated in the form
of trading profits. Many large shareholders are institutional investors for
whom diversification is not a serious issue.89 Second, it would seem that
control premia (and incentive pay for officers and directors) provide suffi-
cient compensation for playing a positive role in corporate governance.90
Third, large shareholders may prefer stringent insider trading restrictions if
they are not privy to inside information, which, again, is likely if they are
outside investors. In that case, they may often be on the losing end of inside
trades. Finally, large outside shareholders are likely to wield considerable
influence over rent-seeking insiders who may be opposed to the firm adopt-
ing a super-compliant ITP.91 Given the potential costs of insider trading,
moreover, they may wish to go beyond the law by adopting super-compliant
ITPs.92
D. Hypothesis 4: Firms with greater firm-specific stock return volatility
are more likely to adopt a super-compliant ITP than firms with
less firm-specific stock return volatility.
Firms with a higher degree of firm-specific (or idiosyncratic) volatility
of their stock returns relative to the total volatility of their stock returns have
a greater flow of firm-specific news into their share prices.93 These firms are
likely to present more profitable insider trading opportunities than firms with
relatively lower firm-specific volatility as a share of total volatility. Accord-
ing to Demsetz:
Firm-specific risk . . . is a plausible measure of the profit potential
of insider trading . . . . High firm-specific risk firms are those
whose fortunes tend to be tied to factors that do not influence
89 Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN.
737 (1997).
90 See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control,
109 Q. J. ECON. 957 (1994).
91 See Shelifer & Vishny, supra note 89. R
92 Furthermore, large shareholders must operate within the current legal framework. Thus,
even if they might like to engage in insider trading, the law does not permit them to.
93 Randall Morck et al., The Information Content of Stock Markets: Why Do Emerging
Markets Have Synchronous Stock Price Movements?, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 215, 255–56, 258
(2000); Merritt B. Fox et al., Law, Share Price Accuracy, and Economic Performance: The
New Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 331, 375–76 (2003).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLB\3-2\HLB206.txt unknown Seq: 20 23-SEP-13 13:31
234 Harvard Business Law Review [Vol. 3
many other firms. Information about common factors . . . will be
known in advance to many persons in many firms that stay in con-
tact with capital markets. Profiting from this information is diffi-
cult because intensive competition to do so is faced from all who
are well positioned to have the same information. In contrast . . .
advanced knowledge about a successful closing in a new large
contract is more likely to be restricted to persons in firms doing
the contracting. Trading on the basis of such firm-specific informa-
tion is likely to be less competitive and more profitable. It is infor-
mation that impacts the fortunes of a specific firm that provides
the best opportunity to profit. Such information is most frequently
encountered in those firms exhibiting high firm-specific risk.94
There is some ambiguity here, however. On the one hand, because in-
sider trading opportunities are likely to be more plentiful in firms character-
ized by relatively greater firm-specific risk, these firms will be more prone
to adopt a super-compliant ITP, other things equal. In that case, we expect to
observe a positive relationship between ITP stringency and firm-specific
risk. On the other hand, to the extent that insider trading increases the flow
of firm-specific information into stock prices, as Manne and Carlton and
Fischel claim,95 overly restricting insider trading will result in stock prices
that reflect less firm-specific information. Firms that think that over time this
will harm markets in their stock or other financial instruments may feel they
would be disadvantaged by adopting an ITP, especially a super-compliant
one. In the latter case, if firm-specific volatility is endogenous to the ITP, we
expect to observe a negative relationship between firm-specific volatility
ITP strictness.
While cognizant of the potential ambiguity here, we find the prediction
of a positive relationship between firm-specific volatility and proclivity to
adopt a super-compliant ITP more compelling than the opposite prediction.
The positive prediction seems more plausible in light of recent empirical
research showing that insider trading laws do not reduce but rather increase
the flow of firm-specific information into stock prices.96  Thus, we hypothe-
size that greater firm-specific return volatility increases the likelihood that a
firm will adopt a super-compliant ITP.
94 Demsetz, supra note 16, at 314–15 (emphasis added). Consistent with this, Demsetz R
finds a strong positive correlation between insider trading and firm-specific risk. Id.
95 See MANNE, supra note 22; Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, supra note 3, at R
868.
96 See Beny, Do Insider Trading Laws Matter? Some Preliminary Comparative Evidence,
supra note 1, at 146, 174 (presenting evidence suggesting that stock prices reflect more firm- R
specific information in markets that have more stringent insider trading regulations). Cf. Nuno
Fernandes & Miguel A. Ferreira, supra note 1, at 1880–81 (reporting similar findings). R
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E. Hypothesis 5: Firms that are cross-listed in the U.S. are more likely
to adopt a super-compliant ITP than firms that are not cross-
listed in the U.S.
The “bonding” hypothesis posits that firms from jurisdictions with
weaker shareholder protections have a strong incentive to cross-list their
shares into foreign markets with stronger shareholder protections.97 By bond-
ing themselves to a more stringent regulatory regime, firms may reduce their
agency costs and attract greater outside investment. Korczak and Lasfer
demonstrate that insiders of U.K. firms cross-listed in the U.S. are less in-
clined to trade on private information than non-cross-listed U.K. firms be-
cause of their dual exposure to U.S. and U.K. insider trading regulations.98
Furthermore, evidence suggests that firms cross-listed on a stock exchange
in a foreign country with a more stringent regulatory regime than the home
country’s are more likely to adopt super-compliant governance standards
than non-cross-listed firms.99 We expect a similar pattern to hold for volun-
tary adoption of ITPs among Canadian firms cross-listed into the U.S. be-
cause the probability that insider trading laws will be publicly enforced is
greater in the U.S. than in Canada and, as noted above, ITPs are a defense to
corporate liability in the U.S. Canadian firms cross-listed into the U.S. also
face a greater risk of a secondary market class action lawsuits (i.e., private
suits) than non-cross-listed Canadian firms.100 Super-compliant ITPs can be a
useful defense to class actions by negating corporate scienter, an element
that must be proven in securities class action lawsuits in the U.S.101 but,
notably, not in Canada. Arguably, the more stringent the ITP, the greater the
public and private liability shield.
In summary, our hypotheses predict what types of firms, among firms
that have an ITP, will have an ITP that is stricter than Canadian insider
trading law. Table 1 summarizes our hypotheses. We test our hypotheses in
the next Part after presenting our empirical methodology and data.
97 See, e.g., William A Reese & Michael S Weisbach, Protection of Minority Shareholder
Interests, Cross-Listings in the United States, and Subsequent Equity Offerings, 66 J. FIN.
ECON. 65, 101, 102 (2002); John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing towards the Top: The Impact of Cross-
Listing and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM.
L. REV. 1757, 1780 (2002); Craig Doidge et al., Why Do Countries Matter So Much for Corpo-
rate Governance?, 86 J. FIN. ECON. 1, 34 (2007); Doidge et al., supra note 31, at 235. R
98 Korczak & Lasfer, supra note 1, at 21. R
99 Anand et al., supra note 34, at 84–85. R
100 See the discussion in note 69, supra.
101 See, e.g., City of Monroe Emp. Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 387 F.3d 468, 485 (6th
Cir. 2004).
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IV. DATA, EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
A. Data Overview
Our initial sample consisted of firms included in the TSX/S&P Index as
of December 31, 2005. We obtained the list of firms from the Market Data
group at the Toronto Stock Exchange. We were able to collect data on 202 of
the 206 firms (or 98%) in the index. We then excluded financial firms and
income trusts from our analysis, yielding a final sample of 181 firms.102 Our
variables fall into two categories. The first category consists of variables
describing whether a firm has an ITP and the features of the firm’s ITP, if it
has one. The second category consists of various firm characteristics that we
use to test our hypotheses. Descriptions of both categories of variables
follow.
B. Characteristics of Firms’ Insider Trading Policies
Our first task was to determine whether or not each firm has an ITP by
referring to the System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval
(SEDAR), which is available online, and to firms’ websites.103 If we found
evidence of an ITP, we gave the variable ITP the value one and, if not, we
gave it the value zero. We could not get reliable data on undisclosed private
ITPs. We assume, however, that if they exist they are few in number because
they would not play the signaling role of reassurance to outside investors or
legal compliance that are probably two important reasons for adopting ITPs.
After determining whether a firm has an ITP, we collected additional
information on each ITP. First, we coded whether the ITP is a separate pub-
lic document or is contained in a published code of conduct or another pub-
licly available document. In some cases, the ITP is described in a required
disclosure document, such as an information (or proxy) circular. In other
cases, the ITP is referenced but is not described or discussed in the disclo-
sure document.
We also recorded whether the firm’s ITP is more stringent than Cana-
dian legal requirements or whether it simply restates Canadian insider trad-
102 In excluding financial firms, we follow standard practice in the corporate finance liter-
ature. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1117, 1145
(1998). We excluded unit trusts because their structure differs significantly from the corporate
structure of the other firms in our sample. Specifically, the business of the trust continues in an
underlying operating corporation and the trust holds all of the debt of the corporation but exists
primarily as an investment vehicle whose governance structure is not regulated by corporate
law.
103 The website www.sedar.com contains most of the public documents and information
filed by Canadian public companies and investment funds with the Canadian Securities Ad-
ministrators (CSA) in the SEDAR filing system. See SEDAR Frequently Asked Questions,
SEDAR, http://sedar.com/sedar/faq_en.htm (last visited July 3, 2013). SEDAR online is the
Canadian equivalent of EDGAR online for U.S. public corporations.
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ing law. We measure stringency with two variables. Our first measure of ITP
stringency is the variable Stringent, which we coded as one if a firm’s ITP
contains a blackout period(s), provides for the appointment of an internal
trading officer or monitor, and/or includes a procedure for employees to ap-
ply to trade during the blackout period, none of which is required by Cana-
dian law.104 If an ITP contains none of these provisions and merely mimics
the requirements of Canadian law, we coded Stringent as zero.105 If an ITP is
ambiguous or unclear for any reason (e.g., if the publicly available docu-
ments contain only a vague description of the policy or none at all), we code
Stringent as a missing value.106 Our second measure of ITP stringency is
whether an ITP contains a clause under which the firm can levy its own (i.e.,
private) penalties against insiders who have breached the firm’s ITP or Cana-
dian insider trading law. If so, the variable Private Penalty equals one and, if
not, Private Penalty equals zero.
C. Firm-Specific Characteristics
To test our hypotheses about the kinds of Canadian firms that are likely
to have ITPs, we collected the following firm-specific information for each
firm: three measures of the firm’s size (stock market capitalization, net sales,
and total assets); the firm’s market-to-book ratio; the number of shareholders
who own more than 10% of the firm’s voting shares (i.e., the number of
controlling shareholders) as a proxy for the likelihood that the firm’s large
shareholders are outsiders, rather than insiders; the firm’s monthly closing
stock prices from January, 2002 through December, 2005 (inclusive), which
we used to calculate monthly stock returns and the firm-specific volatility of
such returns, as described below; and, finally, whether the firm’s shares are
cross-listed on a U.S. stock exchange. We downloaded the accounting mea-
sures and information on U.S. cross-listing from the Standard & Poor’s Com-
pustat database, which is available online. To verify our information on
cross-listing, we also checked SEDAR and company websites. We calculated
the ownership and control variables based on information supplied by firms
through their public disclosures (proxy circular or annual information form)
that are available on SEDAR. We gathered monthly stock prices from Stan-
dard & Poors Compustat. In a few cases, we supplemented these data with
stock prices reported by Datastream or Yahoo.com.
104 These three characteristics are all suggested best practices in National Policy 51-101, as
noted above. We do not distinguish ITPs by the number of ways in which they exceed Cana-
dian legal requirements.
105 For example, if an ITP contains only a prohibition on trading while an “insider” is in
possession of material nonpublic information, but no additional requirements over and above
this legal requirement, we classified the policy as being as strict as Canadian law.
106 We tested for the possibility that we ought to have coded Stringent as a zero if a firm’s
ITP is ambiguous or unclear, since a firm has an incentive to reveal that it follows a recom-
mended best practice and to communicate extra protection to investors. Our results do not
change in any important respect if we replace missing values of Stringent with zero.
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In our multivariate regressions, we also control for a firm’s industry, as
defined by the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), to
account for the fact that firms in some industries may be more prone to
insider trading because of the nature of their assets. For example, firms with
a greater proportion of intangible assets relative to total assets ought to be
more likely to have ITPs than firms with a lower proportion of such assets
because the former firms are characterized by a relatively greater degree of
asymmetric information, which increases the opportunities for insider trad-
ing.107 Controlling for industry addresses this issue to the extent that the na-
ture of corporate assets differs systematically across industries.
D. Volatility of Stock Returns
In order to examine the relationship between ITP stringency and firm-
specific volatility, we use Roll’s methodology for estimating firm-specific
stock return volatility.108 The measure varies from 0 to 1, with a value of 1
indicating that 100% of the variation in a firm’s returns can be attributed to
firm-specific considerations and a value of 0 indicating that none of the vari-
ation in a firm’s returns can be attributed to firm-specific factors or, equiva-
lently, 100% of the variation in a firm’s returns is explainable by changes in
the market return.109
We describe our data and their sources in Table 2.
E. Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 presents data on the prevalence of ITPs among the firms in our
sample. Of the 181 firms in our final sample of TSX/S&P firms, we were
able to identify the existence of an ITP for 167 firms (about 92% of the
sample). We were unable to identify an ITP for 14 firms (about 8% of the
sample). In striking similarity, Bettis et al. find that 92% of their sample
U.S. firms have an ITP.110
As noted, we classify a firm’s ITP as stricter than Canadian insider trad-
ing law if the policy contains blackout period(s), provides for the appoint-
ment of an internal trading officer or monitor and/or consists of a procedure
for employees to apply to trade during the blackout period(s). These provi-
sions are optional best practices, not legal requirements in Ontario. In con-
trast, we classify an ITP as being as strict as Canadian insider trading law
107 Firms with a greater degree of intangible assets have greater asymmetric information
because these assets are harder for outsiders to value than tangible assets.
108 Richard Roll, R2, 43 J. FIN. 541, 557–58 (1988).
109 Id. at 563–65. In brief, firm-specific stock return volatility is calculated as 1- R2 from
the “market model” ordinary least squares regression of the firm’s monthly stock returns on
the market index. See the Appendix for a description of how we calculate firm-specific stock
return volatility.
110 Bettis et al., supra note 2, at 192, 218. R
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(i.e., merely compliant) if it mimics or simply restates existing law. We also
determine whether an ITP permits the firm to levy private penalties (e.g.,
unpaid leave, dismissal, or fines) against insiders who breach the firm’s ITP
or Canadian insider trading law.)
Of the 167 firms we identify as having an ITP, we are able to discern
ITP stringency for 146 of them. Of the latter, 76 (or 52%) have a merely
compliant ITP, while 70 (or 48%) of them have a super-compliant ITP. In
comparison, Bettis et al. find that 78% of their sample U.S. firms have a
super-compliant ITP.111 We are unable to determine ITP stringency for 21 of
the firms we identify as having an ITP. In addition, we are able to identify
the existence or non-existence of private penalties for 152 of the 167 firms
with an identified ITP.112 The majority of these firms provide for private
penalties (112 out of 152, or 74%). It thus appears that firms, once having
adopted an ITP, tend to adopt mechanisms to enforce them. This is some,
though not dispositive, evidence that many firms that have ITPs do not nec-
essarily see them as mere window dressing.
Table 4 presents cross-tabulations between ITP stringency and private
penalties.  The data in Table 4 suggest that firms with ITPs that demand
more than required by Canadian law (i.e., super-compliant ITPs) are not
more inclined to have private penalties for violations than firms with merely
compliant ITPs. Consequently, the ITPs of the latter firms may be viewed as
more stringent than Canadian insider trading law since they provide for addi-
tional penalties over and above the statutory penalties. We address the latter
issue in the ordered probit regressions below.
Table 5 presents summary statistics for our explanatory variables, i.e.,
the firm- specific characteristics. As we expected, because they are firms in
the TSX/S&P Index, the firms in our sample are very large. Just over two-
thirds113 of the firms have a controlling shareholder (i.e., shareholder who
owns more than 10% of outstanding shares) and the average number of con-
trolling shareholders per firm is about one, although some firms have several
large shareholders. For the firms for which we could determine share owner-
ship of the controlling shareholder(s), such shareholder(s) own an average of
41% of the firm’s voting shares, which translates into an average of about
32% of the voting shares per controlling shareholder per firm.114 The average
firm-specific volatility of monthly returns is 92% (i.e., general market
111 Bettis et al., supra note 2, at 192. R
112 Not all firms that we identified as having an ITP provided information about internal
enforcement devices.
113 This result is consistent with prior studies that find that corporate ownership concentra-
tion is relatively high in Canada. See, e.g., CORPORATE DECISION-MAKING IN CANADA, supra
note 16, at 5. R
114 Because we have so few observations on share ownership of controlling shareholders,
we do not use ownership stakes in the regression analyses below.
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changes explain an average of only 8% of monthly return volatility among
the firms in our sample).115
Table 6 compares firm-specific characteristics by ITP strictness – com-
pliant vs. super-compliant. Only the average number of controlling share-
holders differs significantly between the two groups of firms. Consistent
with Hypothesis 3, the firms with super-compliant ITPs have, on average, a
greater number of controlling shareholders than the firms with merely com-
pliant ITPs. The difference is significant at the 1% level. Super-compliant
firms also have greater average market- to-book-ratios and firm-specific re-
turn volatility than merely compliant firms, in accord with Hypotheses 2 and
4, respectively, but the differences are statistically insignificant. Finally, as
predicted by Hypothesis 5, firms with super-compliant ITP are more likely
to be cross-listed in the U.S. than firms with merely compliant ITPs. Again,
however, the difference is insignificant.
Table 7 presents bivariate correlation coefficients for our dependent and
explanatory variables. The directions of the relationships between ITP strin-
gency and firm characteristics are generally as seen in Table 6. However, the
correlation coefficients in Table 7 give us an idea of the strength of these
relationships. Even when they are significant, which is rare, the strengths of
these correlations are low to, at best, moderate, ranging from an absolute
value of 0.01 to an absolute value of 0.23. It is interesting to note, however,
that the larger firms are more likely (while the firms with greater firm-spe-
cific volatility are less likely) to be cross-listed in the U.S.
Our descriptive statistics provide initial insight into the types of Cana-
dian firms that are likely to adopt a super-compliant ITP. They tell a mixed
story. Some factors that we hypothesize are associated with super-compliant
ITPs show a significant association. The magnitude of the association is
often small, however. Moreover, several of the relationships are statistically
insignificant. These bivariate relationships may, however, be sharpened
when we simultaneously control for possible causal factors. Thus, we turn to
our multivariate analysis, which explores the effect of our explanatory vari-
ables net of each other.
F. Empirical Methodology
We use two multivariate models to explore the data. Our first approach
is an ordinary probit model.116 The dependent variable, Y equals 1 if the
firm’s ITP is more restrictive than Canadian insider trading law and 0 if it
does no more than match the requirements of Canadian insider trading law.
Since the dependent variable is dichotomous, i.e., equal to either 0 or 1, we
115 Although the average value of the firm-specific volatility measure (1 minus adjusted
R-squared) seems quite high, at .92, it is roughly consistent with Roll’s findings. Roll, supra
note 108, at 561–62, 564. R
116 See JACK JOHNSTON & JOHN DINARDO, ECONOMETRIC METHODS 419–424 (1997).
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use a probit model to estimate the conditional probability that it equals 1,
that is:
Pr(Y = 1⏐X = x) = F(x′b),
where F is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal dis-
tribution, x is a vector of explanatory variables, and b is a vector of regres-
sion coefficients that explain the relationship between the dependent variable
and the explanatory variables. The probit model posits that the probability
that the dependent variable equals one (i.e., ITP is stricter than Canadian
insider trading law) is a function of the explanatory variables, which in our
case are the firm-specific characteristics described above.
The preceding simple dichotomization of ITP stringency may not quite
capture the relative stringency of corporate policies. For instance, a firm with
an ITP that does not go beyond Canadian statutory requirements but pro-
vides for internal (private) sanctions may nevertheless have a more stringent
corporate policy on insider trading than a firm that has similar rules but does
not provide for internal (private) sanctions. Or, a firm with a merely compli-
ant ITP that provides for private sanctions may effectively have a more strin-
gent policy than a firm that has a super-compliant ITP but no private
sanctions. Thus, in addition to the standard probit analysis described above,
we also conduct an ordered probit analysis, to accommodate a more refined
ordinal ranking of a firm’s ITP policy options. The ordered probit model
takes the following form:
Pr(Y = 1, 2, 3, . . . , n⏐X = x) = F(x′b)
where the dependent variable, Y, equals a discrete value between 1 and n,
with higher values of Y indicating a more stringent corporate policy toward
insider trading. In this model, the probability that the dependent variable
equals 1, 2, 3 . . ., or n is again a function of the firm-specific characteristics
described above. We describe the ordinal ranking of the dependent variable,
which is a function of both formal corporate rules and private sanctions,
below.
G. Multivariate Regression Results
As described above, we first estimate an ordinary probit regression for
the dependent variable ITP strictness relative to Canadian insider trading law
(Y = 1 if ITP is super-compliant and 0 otherwise). The reader will recall that
we presented five testable hypotheses predicting ITP existence and strin-
gency; they are summarized in Table 1. The explanatory variables—log of
stock market capitalization,117 market-to-book ratio, the number of control-
117 In the interest of space, all of the regressions reported in this section use the log of
stock market capitalization as the measure of firm size. However, the results are similar if we
substitute either the log of sales or the log of assets for the log of stock market capitalization as
a measure of firm size.
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ling shareholders, firm-specific volatility of returns,118 and a dummy (0,1)
variable if the firm is cross-listed in the U.S.—test Hypotheses 1 through 5,
respectively.
Table 8 presents the results. The coefficients are reported as marginal
effects, calculated at the mean values of the independent variables.119 In col-
umn (1), the results are as follows. There is no support for Hypotheses 1 and
2, as the coefficients on the log of market capitalization and the market-to-
book ratio are statistically insignificant (although they are positive as we
predicted). By contrast, there is support in column (1) for our remaining
hypotheses. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, having a greater number of con-
trolling shareholders is associated with a greater probability of adopting a
super-compliant ITP. The marginal effect is 0.20, which implies that increas-
ing the number of controlling shareholders by one is associated with a 20%
increase in the probability of having a super-compliant as opposed to merely
compliant ITP for the average firm in our sample. The coefficient is signifi-
cant at the 1% level. Similarly the marginal coefficients on firm-specific
return volatility and cross-listing in the U.S. are both positive and statisti-
cally significant at the 10% level. These results are consistent with Hypothe-
ses 4 and 5, respectively. The marginal coefficient on cross-listing is 0.19,
for instance, which implies that for the average firm in our sample, switch-
ing from non-cross-listed status to cross-listed status is associated with a
19% increase in the probability of having a super-compliant ITP.
In column (2), we augment the regressions with three control variables
that are likely related to the probability of having an ITP in order to provide
a clearer view of the effects of the variables of interest. First, share turnover,
a liquidity measure, gives a sense of the ease with which informed traders
can hide their informed trades. On the one hand, if insiders may easily hide
their trades they may have less fear of liability and thus be inclined not to
adopt a super-compliant ITP. On the other hand, if insider trading is viewed
as harmful to the firm, higher turnover may increase the likelihood of a
super-compliant ITP. Turnover is measured as the number of shares traded
divided by the number of shares outstanding.
Second, we control for total return volatility because higher overall vol-
atility may enable insiders to mask their trades more effectively.120 If insiders
are able to mask their trades, other things equal, insider trading will be more
profitable and therefore more likely. However, again, we have no a priori
directional expectations. Firms with greater total return volatility may be
more inclined to restrict insider trading than firms with lower total return
volatility because there is a greater chance it will happen. Conversely, a
lower danger of discovery and hence scandal may make a firm less likely to
118 We do not report the results for total return volatility in any of the regressions below
and, at any rate, total return volatility is always insignificant in our regressions.
119 See JOHNSTON & DINARDO, supra note 116, at 424. R
120 See, e.g., Kraakman, supra note 8.
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adopt an ITP, particularly since insiders who determine whether to adopt an
ITP will see a good chance of avoiding detection by external monitors in
situations of high total volatility but will have more to fear if there is internal
monitoring as well. We calculate the total volatility of monthly returns as the
average standard deviation of monthly returns. Finally, we control for the
average return on assets, a measure of past performance that may influence
the degree of pressure a firm faces to improve its corporate governance.
Other things equal, a firm with poor recent performance may feel greater
pressure to adopt a super-compliant ITP as well as other corporate govern-
ance measures to allay criticism.
Including the additional controls in column (2) reinforces and even aug-
ments the results in column (1). The coefficients on the number of control-
ling shareholders (Hypothesis 3), firm-specific volatility (Hypothesis 4), and
cross-listed in the U.S. (Hypothesis 5) do not change, except that they are
stronger. Moreover, with the additional controls in column 2, the marginal
coefficient (0.05) on the market-to-book ratio becomes statistically signifi-
cant. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, this result suggests that a one unit in-
crease in the market-to-book ratio results in a 5% increase in the probability
of having a super-compliant ITP for the average firm in our sample. Figures
1-3 graphically depict these results.
FIGURE 1. PROBABILITY OF STRINGENT ITP, BY NUMBER OF CONTROLLING
SHAREHOLDERS AND CROSS-LISTED STATUS
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FIGURE 2. PROBABILITY OF STRINGENT ITP, BY FIRM-SPECIFIC VOLATILITY
AND CROSS-LISTED STATUS
FIGURE 3. PROBABILITY OF STRINGENT ITP, BY BOOK-TO-MARKET RATIO
AND CROSS-LISTED STATUS
In summary, the ordinary probit results support four of our five hypoth-
eses about the determinants of Canadian/TSX firms’ adoption of a super-
compliant ITP. As noted above, however, our initial categorization of ITP
stringency may not fully capture the relative stringency of corporate policies.
Thus, we construct a more nuanced ordinal ranking of ITP stringency and
use this ranking to estimate an ordered probit model.121 The dependent varia-
ble, Ordered_Stringency, equals 1, 2, 3, or 4 with the value increasing in ITP
restrictiveness. Thus, Ordered_Stringency equals 1 if the firm does not have
121 See JOHNSTON & DINARDO, supra note 116, at 434–36. R
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an ITP, 2 if the firm has an ITP but no provision for private sanctions, 3 if
either the firm has an ITP and may impose private sanctions or the firm’s
ITP is more restrictive than Canadian insider trading law but does not pro-
vide for private sanctions,122 and 4 if the firm’s ITP is more restrictive than
Canadian insider trading law and the firm may impose private sanctions.
Table 9 presents the ordered probit results, where the reported coeffi-
cients are standard probit coefficients, not marginal effects. A positive coef-
ficient on a variable implies that an increase in the value of that variable is
associated with an increase in the probability of a more stringent ITP (per
our ranking).123 The results in column (1) support Hypotheses 1, 3 and 5.
That is, the reported coefficients suggest that the probability of a more strin-
gent ITP (per our ordering) is increasing with firm size, the number of con-
trolling shareholders, and cross-listed status. When we add the additional
control variables (return on assets, turnover and total volatility of returns) in
column (2), however, only the number of controlling shareholders remains
significant at the 1% level.
There are a few possible explanations for the weakness of the ordered
probit results as compared to the ordinary probit results. First, the ordered
probit model imposes greater restrictions on the data than the ordinary probit
model.124 Second, we suspect that our coding of internal sanctions is plagued
by measurement error, thus reducing the precision of our regression esti-
mates.125 There would be measurement error, for instance, if firms tend to
publicize their ITPs, but not corporate mechanisms for privately enforcing
them. Third, in the unlikely event that we have measured internal sanctions
with few errors, it is possible that our ranking of stringency is incorrect. That
would seem to be the case, for example, if having an ITP that is equally
strict as the law and an internal enforcement mechanism does not offer a
firm much more (e.g., in deterrence or liability avoidance) than Canadian
insider trading law already offers, while having an ITP that is stricter than
Canadian law, albeit without provision for private sanctions, offers more
than existing law. Another possibility is that private sanctions are less rele-
vant than public sanctions because private parties (including firms) are less
able to detect insider trading than a public regulator with sophisticated sur-
veillance technology, like the SEC.126
122 We construct category 3 in this manner in order to avoid making any assumption about
the relative importance of formal restrictions and private enforcement, as it may be impossible
to rank the two in any meaningful sense.
123 See JOHNSTON & DINARDO, supra note 116, at 435–36. R
124 Id.
125 See id. at 399–401.
126 Michael P. Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1,
16–17 (1980). Glaeser et al. also address the general issue of public versus private regulation
of stock markets. Edward Glaeser et al., Coase Versus the Coasians, 116 Q.J. ECON. 853
(2001).
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CONCLUSION
While voluminous, the literature on insider trading provides little em-
pirical evidence on firms’ motives for privately regulating insider trading in
the context of the near ubiquitous legal prohibition. In this article, we forge
new ground by providing empirical evidence on this issue in a market where
insider trading laws exist but are not vigorously enforced. Using data on
Canadian firms included in the TSX/S&P Index, we attempt to understand
the types, and indirectly the motives, of Canadian firms that privately regu-
late insider trading beyond the requirements of Canadian law in spite of, or
perhaps because of, lax public enforcement.
Our empirical investigation supports four of our five hypotheses.127 In
particular, the probability of a Canadian firm having a super-compliant in-
sider trading policy is increasing in such firm’s market-to-book ratio, number
of controlling shareholders, firm-specific return volatility, and being cross-
listed in the U.S. We find that Canadian firms with greater market-to-book
valuations and firms whose stock returns exhibit greater firm-specific varia-
tion, both of which may imply greater insider trading opportunities, are more
likely to have super-compliant ITPs than firms with lower market-to-book
valuations and firms whose stock prices are more predictable based on gen-
eral market trends. We also find that firms with a greater number of control-
ling shareholders and firms that are cross-listed in the United States, where
insider trading laws are more vigorously enforced, are more likely to have
super-compliant ITPs.
Our findings have several intriguing implications. First, while we can-
not entirely rule out window dressing or the simple proclivity to enact and
publicize ITPs, our results suggest there is more to the story than that. If
window dressing fully explains ITPs, most, if not all, TSX/S&P firms ought
to have super-compliant ITPs because the stronger the policy, the more at-
tractive the window. We find, however, that TSX/S&P firms exhibit a range
of organizational approaches to insider trading and that their choices are
largely consistent with hypothesized (private) cost-benefit considerations.
That is, ITP stringency is associated with firm-specific characteristics that
plausibly correlate with latent private costs and benefits of restricting insider
trading.
Second, our results are consistent with the compliance/liability avoid-
ance rationale for ITPs. The clearest support for this is our finding that cross-
listed firms are more likely to have super-compliant ITPs than non-cross-
listed firms, suggesting that the stringent U.S. enforcement regime has a
non-trivial extraterritorial effect on Canadian firms. Insider trading laws are
127 This discussion focuses on our ordinary probit regression results. When we run probit
regressions on our more nuanced ordinal ranking, the only variable that is significant in the
hypothesized direction is the number of controlling shareholders. But, for reasons discussed
above, our ordinal approach is somewhat more problematic and should be interpreted with
caution.
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more likely to be enforced in the U.S. against corporate insiders and firms,
the latter pursuant to a theory of derivative liability, than in Canada. Cana-
dian firms subject to the U.S. securities enforcement regime may shield
themselves from liability by adopting ITPs and, we suspect, the more strin-
gent the ITP, the more powerful the legal shield, as a court may be less
inclined to disregard a maximal corporate policy than a de minimis one. A
cynic may argue, however, that the cross- listing effect demonstrates, at best,
that firms will only do what the law requires and, at worst, the “imperial-
ism” of U.S. securities enforcement.128
But compliance/liability avoidance does not fully explain our results,
nor does U.S. regulatory imperialism. In light of the lax Canadian enforce-
ment regime, if compliance/liability avoidance were the sole raison d’eˆtre of
private insider trading restrictions, we would expect firm characteristics, ex-
cept cross-listing status, to be insignificant. Yet, as noted above, our data do
not show this and cross-listing is not the only factor relevant to ITP exis-
tence and stringency. On the contrary, controlling for cross-listing status, we
find that several additional firm-specific characteristics that correlate with a
firm’s risk of insider trading are significantly associated with ITP stringency.
This suggests there are reasons for ITP enactment beyond pure window
dressing and pure compliance/liability avoidance. We interpret the residual
purpose for ITPs as the desire of at least some firms to control insider trad-
ing to enhance corporate performance. Seen in this light, the cross-listing
effect may reflect voluntary bonding for economic benefits rather than mere
compliance/liability avoidance or, worse, U.S. regulatory imperialism.
Third, our (most robust) finding that firms with more controlling share-
holders are more likely to have a super-compliant ITP than firms with fewer
controlling shareholders suggests that influential shareholders may oppose
insider trading. More specifically, influential shareholders may dislike in-
sider trading when others are in as good a position to benefit from insider
trading as they are, thereby reducing their trading profits. It also suggests
that reality may be more nuanced than Bhide and Demsetz contemplate.129 In
particular, controlling shareholders may prefer collectively tying their hands
over competing among themselves for dissipating insider trading profits. Al-
ternatively, consistent with Maug’s analysis,130 some controlling shareholders
may be outsiders (e.g., institutional investors) who wish to keep both insider
controlling shareholders and managers in check (i.e., reduce agency costs)
by prohibiting them from engaging in insider trading.131 The latter interpreta-
128 For a critique of U.S. regulatory “imperialism”, see Roberta Romano, The Need for
Competition in International Securities Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 387 (2001).
129 Bhide, supra note 17; Demsetz, supra note 17. R
130 See Maug, supra note 8. R
131 See, e.g., Roulstone, supra note 12, at 536. The greater the number of controlling R
shareholders, the more likely some of them are to be outsiders. More cynically, dominant
shareholders may prefer ITPs because they prevent insiders from trading, giving these share-
holders a monopoly on trading profits. We doubt this explanation, however, because outside
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tion is consistent with Beny’s finding of a positive relationship between in-
sider trading law stringency and corporate valuation among firms with a
controlling shareholder in common law countries.132
Finally, this article contributes to the longstanding debate about the ef-
ficiency of insider trading regulation insofar as an influential claim in that
debate is that firms do not desire to restrict insider trading. We document
that some firms do wish to limit insider trading, often beyond what the law
requires, and do so voluntarily in an environment where they face relatively
little risk of public or private enforcement. Indeed, we think that, on net, our
empirical results add to the case made by those who see insider trading as
possibly economically harmful.133 We concede, however, that our data do not
prove this. Still, if there are strong negative effects to insider trading bans, as
some have argued, nothing about the behavior of the firms in our data sug-
gests this.
Overall, our results may be viewed as supporting the intermediate posi-
tion in the insider trading debate—i.e., the claim that firms will pursue pri-
vately optimal approaches to insider trading.134 Our findings only partially
support the intermediate position, however, because that position suggests
that in some cases permitting insider trading may be optimal. Yet, the exis-
tence of the insider prohibition means that firms rationally will not choose
ITPs that allow insider trading (left censorship), even if it would be privately
optimal for them to do so, because such ITPs would violate the law. By
contrast, our results call into question the deregulatory position—i.e., the
claim that private restrictions of insider trading would never arise in the
absence of the prohibition135—because they show that many Canadian firms
privately restrict insider trading even though they face little threat of insider
trading liability.136
dominant shareholders’ ability to profitably trade often depends on their receiving tips from
insiders.
132 Beny, Do Investors in Controlled Firms Value Insider Trading Laws? International
Evidence, supra note 1, at 291. The results discussed in this article suggest that outside inves- R
tors may value the protection vis-a`-vis insiders, and possibly also dominant shareholders, that
strong insider trading laws provide.
133 As noted, our data support several of our hypotheses, which predict ITP stringency on
the assumption that insider trading on balance hurts firms and hurts those most vulnerable to
insider trading the most. The marginal insignificance of some of our results may result from
small sample size, the possibility that our judgments about how our variables would affect the
likelihood of insider trading are mistaken, or the possibility that although our judgments about
the variables’ implications are correct, firms that are more vulnerable to insider trading fail to
perceive this.
134 Epstein, supra note 24, at 314; Haddock & Macey, supra note 25, at 1467–68. R
135 Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 894. R
136 The intermediate position is not fully empirically testable because we cannot observe
the left-tail, i.e., whether some firms would privately permit insider trading (if that were the
optimal approach for them). We can only observe the right-tail, i.e., that some firms restrict
insider trading beyond what the law requires and with varying degrees of intensity. Taking the
law as given, however, the data more strongly support the intermediate position than the fully
negative (deregulatory) position. We are completely unable to test the fully positive (regula-
tory) position for the reasons noted above.
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Several important questions for emerge from our study. One question is
the identity of the dominant shareholders who appear to have a significant
influence upon the adoption of super-compliant ITPs, which is data difficult
to obtain.  Do these shareholders tend to be insiders or outsiders? If they are
outsiders, they are likely to be institutional investors who are better able than
dispersed public shareholders to overcome the collective action problem that
impedes direct bargaining between corporate insiders and shareholders at
large.  Whether they are insider or outsiders, what are these dominant share-
holders’ primary motivations for desiring corporate insider trading policies
(along with other corporate governance measures)?  Do the motives vary
between dominant insiders and outsiders? Another open question concerns
the adoption process of corporate insider trading policies. Do corporations
adopt them unilaterally to attract external investors (as well as comply with
the law) or do such policies emerge from a process of negotiation between
corporate policymakers and influential shareholders? Finally, it would be in-
teresting to study both the effectiveness and enforcement propensities of cor-
porate insider policies, to the extent these data are available.
We leave these questions and others to future empirical research.
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APPENDIX 1: TABLES
TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES
Hypothesis Summary
Hypothesis Larger firms are more likely to adopt a super-compliant ITP than smaller
1 firms
Hypothesis Firms with higher market-to-book ratios are more likely to adopt a
2 super-compliant ITP than firms with lower market-to-book ratios
Hypothesis Firms with more influential outside investors are more likely to adopt a
3 super-compliant ITP than firms with fewer such investors
Hypothesis Firms with more firm-specific volatility of stock returns are more likely
4 to adopt a super-compliant ITP than firms with lower firm-specific
volatility of stock returns
Hypothesis Firms that are cross-listed in the U.S. are more likely to have a
5 compliant or super-compliant ITP than firms that are not cross-listed in
the U.S.
TABLE 2: DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES
Variable Descripton
Variables Related to Insider Trading Policies
ITP This variable equals 1 if the company has an ITP that is
publicly available, i.e., the company’s ITP appears or is
mentioned in any paper or web-based document published
on the company’s website or SEDAR, and 0 otherwise.
Source: SEDAR and firms’ websites.
Stringent This variable equals 1 if the company’s ITP is stricter than
existing insider trading law, i.e., the company’s ITP
stipulates a blackout period(s), requires the appointment of
an internal trading officer or monitor, or requires
application to trade during the blackout period(s).
Conversely, this variable equals 0 if the company’s ITP is
as strict as existing insider trading law, i.e., the company’s
ITP merely contains a prohibition on trading while in
possession of material nonpublic information).
Source: SEDAR and firms’ websites.
Private Penalty This variable equals 1 if the company’s ITP provides that
the company will levy its own penalty in the event of
breach of the ITP or insider trading laws, and 0 otherwise.
Source: SEDAR and firms’ websites.
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Firm-Specific Characteristics
Stock Market Capitalization This variable is the company’s stock market capitalization,
the closing stock price multiplied by the number of
outstanding shares in 2005. It is a measure of the firm’s
size.
Source: Standard & Poor’s Compustat.
Sales Revenue This variable is the company’s net sales in 2005. It is a
second measure of the firm’s size.
Source: Standard & Poor’s Compustat.
Assets This variable is the company’s total assets in 2005. It is a
third measure of firm size.
Source: Standard & Poor’s Compustat.
Market-to-Book Ratio This variable is the ratio of the company’s market value
(common shares outstanding multiplied by the stock price)
to its book value of equity in 2005.
Source: Standard & Poor’s Compustat.
Number of Controlling This variable is the number of shareholders who owned
Shareholders more than 10% of the firm’s voting shares in 2005.
Source: SEDAR.
Cross-Listed in the U.S. This variable equals 1 if the company’s shares were cross-
listed on a U.S. exchange in 2005, and 0 otherwise.
Source: SEDAR, Standard & Poor’s Compustat and firms’
websites.
Firm-Specific Volatility of This variable equals one minus the adjusted R2 from the
Stock Returns market model of stock returns. It measures the variation in
a firm’s monthly returns that cannot be explained by general
changes in the market.
Source: monthly stock prices came from Standard & Poor’s
Compustat. In a few cases, we supplemented these data
with monthly stock prices from Datastream or Yahoo.com.
Industry Codes Source: Standard and Poor’s Compustat.
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TABLE 4: CROSS-TABULATION OF ITP STRINGENCY AND EXISTENCE OF
PRIVATE PENALTY
Firm does not
have Private Firm has Private Total Number of
Type Penalty Penalty Firms
ITP Equally as
Strict as Canadian 19 57 76
Law (Stringent (11.4%) (34.1%) (45.5%)
equals 0)
ITP More Strict
than Canadian 19 50 69
Law (Stringent (11.4%) (29.9%) (41.3%)
equals 1)
Total Number of 38 107 145
Firms (22.7%) (64.1%) (86.8%)
The numbers in parentheses are percentages of all firms that have an ITP that exhibit the
given characteristic.
TABLE 5: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
All variables described in Table 2.
Mean Standard
Characteristic No. Obs. (Median) Deviation
$4,900
Market Capitalization (millions) 181 $7,720($1,720)
3.31
Market-to-Book Ratio 168 2.81(2.53)
Number of Controlling 0.95
176 0.95Shareholders (1.0)
Firm-Specific Volatility of 0.92
Returns (1- adjusted R2 from 167 0.13(0.97)
Market Model Regression)
0.49
Cross-listed in the U.S. (0 or 1) 174 0.50(0.0)
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TABLE 6: DIFFERENCE IN MEANS
CHARACTERISTICS OF FIRMS BY STRICTNESS OF ITPS
Equally Strict
as Law Stricter Than t-statistic*
(Stringent Law (Stringent (difference in
Characteristic equals 0) equals 1) means)
Market Capitalization $5,740 $5,520 0.15
(millions)
Market-to-Book Ratio 3.11 3.42 -0.64
Number of Controlling 0.79 1.24 -2.72a
Shareholders
Firm-Specific Volatility of 90% 93% -1.61
Returns
(1- adjusted R2 from Market
Model Regression)
Cross-listed in the U.S. 48% 56% -1.02
*Superscript a denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. All variables are described in
Table 2.
TABLE 7: BIVARIATE CORRELATIONS
Stock Market-to- No. of Firm- Cross-
Stricter Market Book Cont. Specific Listed in
than Law Cap. Ratio Sh’rs Volatility the U.S.
Stricter than Law 1.00
Stock Market -0.01 1.00
Capitalization (0.88)
Market-to-Book 0.05 0.08 1.00
Ratio (0.52) (0.31)
Number of 0.22 -0.16 -0.20 1.00
Controlling (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
Shareholders
Firm-Specific 0.14 0.07 0.09 -0.04 1.00
Volatility of Returns (0.11) (0.37) (0.26) (0.62)
Cross-Listed in the 0.08 0.22b -0.02 -0.15 -0.23c 1.00
U.S. (0.31) (0.00) (0.78) (0.04) (0.00)
The superscripts b and c denote statistical significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Standard errors are in parentheses. All variables are described in Table 2.
TABLE 8: PROBIT REGRESSIONS
DETERMINANTS OF HAVING AN ITP THAT IS STRICTER THAN ONTARIO
INSIDER TRADING LAW (I.E., SUPER-COMPLIANT ITP)
This table presents probit regressions on the determinants of ITP strictness.
The dependent variable, Stringent, equals 1 if the ITP is stricter than Ontario
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insider trading law, and 0 otherwise. The coefficients on explanatory vari-
ables are reported as marginal effects (calculated at the mean values of the
independent variables). Superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical signifi-
cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses. All variables are described in Table 2.
Explanatory Variable (1) (2)
Log of Market Capitalization 0.01 -0.005
(0.42) (0.05)
Market-to-Book Ratio 0.02 0.05c
(0.02) (0.03)
Number of Controlling Shareholders 0.20a 0.21a
(0.06) (0.06)
Firm-Specific Volatility (1- adjusted R2 from Market 0.81c 1.04b
Model Regression) (0.44) (0.47)
Cross-listed in the U.S. 0.19c 0.20c
(0.11) (0.18)




Total Return Volatility -0.00
(0.01)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes
Number of Observations 127 120
Pseudo R2 0.18 0.20
÷
2 21.86 23.40
Prob > ÷2 0.01 0.04
TABLE 9: ORDERED PROBIT REGRESSIONS
This table presents ordered probit regressions on the determinants of ITP
strictness. The dependent variable, Ordered_Stringency, equals 1 if the firm
does not have an ITP (ITP = 0); 2 if the firm has an ITP (ITP = 1) but no
mechanism for imposing private sanctions (Private Penalty = 0); 3 if the
firm has an ITP (ITP = 1) and may impose private sanctions (Private Pen-
alty = 1); 3 if the firm’s ITP is more restrictive than Canadian insider trading
law (Stringent = 1) but the firm does not have a mechanism for imposing
private sanctions (Private Penalty = 0); and 4 if the firm’s ITP is more
restrictive than Canadian insider trading law (Stringent = 1) and the firm
may impose private sanctions (Private Penalty = 1). Reported coefficients
are standard probit coefficients, not marginal effects. Superscripts a, b, and c
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. All variables are de-
scribed in Table 2.
Explanatory Variable (1) (2)
Log of Market Capitalization 0.18b 0.16
(0.08) (0.10)
Market-to-Book Ratio 0.02 0.08
(0.03) (0.06)
Number of Controlling Shareholders 0.36a 0.34a
(0.11) (0.11)
Firm-Specific Volatility 0.58 1.00
(1- adjusted R2 from Market Model Regression) (0.78) (0.81)
Cross-listed in the U.S. 0.34c 0.28
(0.21) (0.23)




Total Return Volatility -0.02
(0.02)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes
Number of Observations 134 126
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.07
÷
2 27.00 27.02
Prob > ÷2 0.00 0.00
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APPENDIX 2:
ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATION OF FIRM-SPECIFIC STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY
To estimate firm-specific stock return volatility, we estimated the “market
model” ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of the firm’s monthly re-
turns on the monthly returns to the market index:
ri,t = ai,t + birm,t + ei,t ,
where rit is the total return on stock i in period t, rmt is the total return on the
market index over the same period, t, the a’s and the b’s are the estimated
OLS regression coefficients, and eit is the “unexplained”/unique/firm-
specific component of stock i’s return in period t. We estimate the market
model using monthly returns, which we calculate from closing monthly
stock prices (adjusted for dividends and stock splits) from January 2002
through December 31, 2005. We use Standard and Poor’s Composite TSX
Composite Index as the market index. The adjusted R2 from this regression
measures the fraction of the variation in a firm’s monthly returns that is ex-
plainable by changes in the market return. The remainder, i.e., the unex-
plained fraction of the variation in a firm’s monthly returns, can be attributed
to unique information about the firm. Thus, 1- adjusted R2 is a proxy for
firm-specific volatility.
